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 On February 18, 2005, Congress passed the Class Action 
Fairness Act (“CAFA”).1  CAFA makes major changes to class action 
procedure in federal courts, and expands federal courts’ diversity 
jurisdiction over class action cases.2  In light of this new legislation, 
circuit and district courts face the task of interpreting some of CAFA’s 
more ambiguous provisions.  In particular, courts must determine to 
which cases CAFA applies.  Section 9 of CAFA provides that the 
“[a]ct shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of 
enactment of this Act.”3  Although seemingly straightforward, CAFA 
does not define the term “commenced”, leaving courts to interpret the 
term in light of existing state and federal law.  CAFA clearly applies to 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution.  
1 Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
2 28 U.S.C. 1332 (d)(2), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). 
3 Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 § 9 (2005). 
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cases which were filed after its enactment4, but defendants seeking 
removal have argued that CAFA provides diversity jurisdiction over 
cases which were already pending in state court in February 18, 2005, 
in some circumstances.   
Only a handful of circuit courts have addressed when a civil 
action has “commenced” for purposes of jurisdiction under CAFA.5  
The Seventh Circuit, however, decided a series of cases regarding 
CAFA’s applicability to pending state court suits in the past year.6  
The Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted the term “commenced”, 
holding that CAFA provides jurisdiction over class action suits that 
were initially filed in state court pre-CAFA, but where plaintiffs 
amend the complaint, post-CAFA, to either: 1) add new defendants, or 
2) add new claims which do not relate back to the original pleadings.7  
The two circuit courts subsequently addressing the issue have adopted 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.8 
However, some district courts have voiced concern that the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is contrary to congressional intent and 
the plain language of CAFA, because it retroactively applies the 
statute.9  How courts ultimately decide to define “commenced” will 
implicate all state class action suits that were filed before CAFA’s 
enactment that meet the new requirements for diversity jurisdiction.   
                                                 
4 See generally Pfizer v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2005); Bush v. 
Cheaptickets, 425 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005). 
5 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all held that a civil action filed 
in state court pre-CAFA may be subject to federal jurisdiction if plaintiffs add a new 
defendant or new claim post-CAFA.  See Braud v. Transport Service Co. of Illinois, 
445 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2006); Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (“Knudsen II”), 
435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2006); Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 
2006). 
6 Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (“Knudsen I”), 411 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 
2005); Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2005); Knudsen II, 
435 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2006). 
7 Id. 
8 Braud, 445 F.3d at 806; Plubell, 434 F.3d at 1072-74. 
9 Weekly v. Guidant, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Brown v. 
Kerkhoff, No. 4:05 CV 00274 JEG, 2005 WL 2671529 (S.D. Iowa October 19, 
2005); Comes v. Microsoft, 403 F.Supp.2d 897, 903 (S.D. Iowa 2005).  
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Class members’ settled expectations of staying in state court are likely 
to be upset if defendants are able to remove these pending cases to 
federal court.10   
This article analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s decisions 
interpreting CAFA’s commencement provision.  Part I provides 
background information on CAFA’s provisions and purpose.  Part II 
outlines both the Seventh Circuit’s decisions interpreting § 9 of CAFA 
and the arguments against the Seventh Circuit approach, and 
concludes that the Seventh Circuit has reached the correct result in 




 Members of Congress have attempted to pass some version of 
class action reform for years.11  Proponents of class action reform cite 
to numerous abuses in the pre-CAFA system, many of which stem 
from the fact that most class actions are adjudicated in state court.12  
Proponents claim that state court judges have a reputation for 
certifying classes and approving settlements too hastily, the impact 
being that class members end up recovering little, costs get passed on 
to the consumer, and class counsel ends up the big winner.13  To 
remedy this situation, CAFA has three major provisions: first, CAFA 
includes a “consumer class action bill of rights” which provides 
                                                 
10 Although there are situations where plaintiffs may prefer to have their suit 
litigated in federal court, this article focuses on removal by defendants under the 
assumption that plaintiffs would prefer to litigate their claim in state court.   
11 See Class Action Fairness Act of 1997, 143 CONG. REC. S. 897 (daily ed, 
Jan. 30, 1997) (Statement of Sen. Kohl);The Class Action Fairness Act of 2000,;146 
CONG. REC. S. 7812 (daily ed, July 27, 2000) (Statement of Sen. Grams), The Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2001, 147 CONG. REC. S. 11946 (daily ed, Nov. 15, 2001) 
(Statement of Sen. Grassley); Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. e. 
405 (daily ed, March 7, 2003) (Statement of Sen. Goodlatte); Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005,. 150 CONG. REC. S. 450 (daily ed, Jan 25, 2005) (Statement of Sen. 
Kohl). 
12 Pub. L. 109-14, 119 Stat. 324 (2005). 
13 Pub. L. 109-14, 119 Stat. 324 (2005). 
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safeguards for coupon settlements14; second, CAFA directs the 
Judicial Conference of the United States to review settlements and 
attorneys’ fees in class actions, and present Congress with 
recommendations for determining fees’ in a more fair and reasonable 
manner15; third, and most relevant to this article, CAFA expands 
federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate class actions suits.16 
 Pre-CAFA, defendants faced several obstacles to removing 
interstate class action suits to federal court.  Defendants could remove 
class action suits if the federal court would have had original 
jurisdiction over the suit—meaning that there was a federal claim or 
the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were met.  Federal courts 
generally have diversity jurisdiction over a suit where the plaintiff and 
defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000.17  Because of the sheer number of parties to class 
action suits, these requirements can pose a problem.   
The Supreme Court interpreted the diversity requirement of 
§1332 to mean that all named class representatives must be diverse 
from all named defendants.  In other words, plaintiffs could prevent 
defendants from removing class actions to federal court by including 
one non-diverse class representative or defendant.   This complete 
diversity requirement had the effect of keeping many interstate suits in 
state court.   
The amount in controversy requirement also posed an obstacle 
to defendants seeking to remove class actions to federal court.  An 
early Supreme Court case, Zahn v. International Paper Co., 
interpreted the statute to require that each individual class member 
have a claim which exceeded $75,000.18  The Supreme Court recently 
overturned Zahn, in Exxon Corp. v. Allapattah Services, holding that 
28 U.S.C. § 1367, would allow the court to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over class members who did not have claims exceeding 
                                                 
14 Pub. L. 109-2 119 Stat. 4 § 3(2005). 
15 Id. at § 6. 
16 Id. at §§ 4-5.  
17 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2005). 
18 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
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$75,000.19  Therefore, so long as one plaintiff had a claim exceeding 
$75,000, a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
other claims.20   
However, even with a relaxed amount in controversy 
requirement, many class action suits would stay in state court.  The 
purpose of class actions is to make it economically feasible for large 
groups of people with small individual claims to pursue litigation to 
recover damages.21  It’s possible that many state class action suits will 
not have a class member with a claim over $75,000.  Therefore, in 
order to prevent a defendant from removing a class action to federal 
court, a plaintiff would need only avoid pleading a federal question, 
and either include a non-diverse named plaintiff or defendant or allege 
less than $75,000 in damages for each party.  This creates the absurd 
result that federal courts can easily hear cases where two parties from 
different states have been in a car accident, and one party alleges 
damages of $75,001; however, where a nationwide class of plaintiffs 
are bringing a $25 million dollar suit against a major corporation and a 
local defendant, and no class member has a claim above $75,000, 
defendants will be unable to remove that case to federal court.   
Because plaintiffs’ lawyers were able to easily evade federal 
diversity jurisdiction, the number of state court class actions suits has 
increased dramatically in recent years.  Moreover, many of these suits 
were brought in improbable jurisdictions where judges had a 
reputation for certifying most classes or approving crazy settlements.  
The Circuit Court of Madison County, Illinois, for example, saw a 
huge rise in class actions suits.  Madison County is home to less than 
one percent of the U.S. population, yet in 2003, 106 class action suits 
were filed there.  That is an increase of more than 5,000 percent 
between 1998 and 2003.  Studies have shown that the most of the suits 
filed in these “hotbeds” have little, if nothing, to do with the venues in 
which they were brought. 
                                                 
19 125 S.Ct. 2611 (2005). 
20 Id. 
21 S. Rep. No. 109-14. February 28, 2005. 
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The Senate Report on CAFA notes that the increase in state 
class actions suits cannot be attributed to differences in the rules 
governing class action.  Rules regarding whether a suit can proceed as 
a class are basically the same in state and federal courts—thirty-six 
states have adopted Rule 23, which governs federal class actions.  
Furthermore, rules in the hotbed state courts are the same as all other 
courts in the state.  The logical explanation for the popularity of some 
courts of others, therefore, is that some state court judges are more lax 
about applying the procedural requirements of class action rules.   
CAFA, by amending both 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1441, broadens federal jurisdiction over diversity class action suits and 
eliminates many of the barriers to removal that have caused concern to 
reform proponents.  CAFA has three major requirements: (1) any one 
plaintiff (named or unnamed) must be diverse from any one defendant; 
(2) the aggregate amount in controversy of all plaintiffs must exceed 
$5,000,000; and (3) there must be at least 100 members in the 
proposed class.22  CAFA, therefore, has eliminated the two major 
barriers to removing state class action suits to federal court, complete 
diversity and the $75,000 minimal amount in controversy for at least 
one class member.  Furthermore, CAFA provides that cases may be 
removed by a single defendant, changing the rule that all defendants 
must consent to removal.23  Finally, CAFA eliminates the one-year 
limit on removing diversity cases.24  The effect of CAFA will likely be 
a shift in the concentration of class action litigation from state courts 
to federal courts.  Because of these relaxed removal requirements, 
many plaintiffs’ attorneys rushed to file class action suits in state court 
before CAFA’s enactment. 
Section 9 of CAFA states that it applies “to any civil action 
commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.”25  However, 
CAFA does not define the term “commence”, and defendants have 
                                                 
22 Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 § 3 (2005).  
23 Id. at § 5. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at § 9. 
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offered several interpretations in an attempt to remove pending state 
suits.   
Defendants have attempted to remove suits that were filed in 
state court pre-CAFA on the theory that removal to federal court 
constitutes commencement of a new civil action.26  The circuits have 
unanimously rejected this argument, holding that state law defines 
when a suit is commenced and that removal to federal court does not 
re-commence a civil action.27  Most states’ laws mirror Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3, which provides that a suit is commenced at the 
time it is properly filed in an appropriate court.28   
A real concern for practitioners is whether post-CAFA 
amendments to complaints, which add new claims or defendants, can 
commence a new civil action--and thus allow defendants to remove 
pending cases that were filed in state court before CAFA’s enactment. 
 
II. INTERPRETING § 9 OF CAFA: WHEN DOES A CIVIL ACTION 
“COMMENCE”? 
  
Although most circuit courts have not yet addressed CAFA’s 
applicability to cases filed in state court before February 18, 2005, the 
Seventh Circuit was presented with a series of cases in the past year 
that have enabled it to develop a working definition of CAFA’s 
commencement provision. 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
 
 In Knudsen v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that CAFA did not provide jurisdiction over a case 
which had been filed in state court prior to the Act, but where 
plaintiffs changed the class definition post-CAFA.29  The class 
                                                 
26 Pfizer v. Lott, 417 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2005); Bush v. Cheaptickets, 425 
F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). 
27 Pfizer, 417 F.3d at 728; Bush, 425 F.3d at 686  
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 
29 411 F.3d 805, 807-808 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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representatives in Knudsen originally filed their complaint listing 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”) as the sole 
defendant.30  Liberty Mutual responded that the representatives’ 
claims derived from policies issued by a separate entity, Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual Fire”), and thus 
they did not belong to a class that had a claim against Liberty.31  
Plaintiffs then proposed to amend the class to include all insureds of 
both Liberty Mutual and “Liberty Fire Insurance Company”, their 
beneficiaries, and their assignees who submitted medical bills and 
whose claims were paid for less than the medical charge.32  Although 
the proposed amendment added class members who had claims against 
another party, the plaintiff class did not purport to add that party as a 
defendant.33  Liberty Mutual removed to federal district court before 
the state court judge could address the plaintiffs’ proposal.34  The 
district court remanded the case on the grounds that CAFA did not 
provide jurisdiction over suits which were filed in state court before its 
effective date, and the Seventh Circuit heard the case on interlocutory 
appeal.35   
 The Seventh Circuit noted that there were several problems 
with plaintiffs’ proposed change in class definition.  First, “Liberty 
Fire Insurance Company” did not exist; presumably plaintiffs had 
intended to include the insureds of “Liberty Mutual Fire”, but made an 
error in their proposal.36  Moreover, plaintiffs never added “Liberty 
Mutual Fire” as a party to the suit.37  The court granted plaintiffs’ 
motion to remand, noting that Liberty Mutual could not remove the 
                                                 





35 Id. at 806. 
36 Id. at 807. 
37 Id. 
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case “just because a non-party corporate sibling has been mentioned in 
plaintiffs’ latest papers(emphasis added).”38  
Although the court found that federal jurisdiction under CAFA 
was not present in these circumstances, it hinted at other scenarios 
where CAFA might confer jurisdiction.  First, if the plaintiff class in 
Knudsen added Liberty Mutual Fire as a defendant, Liberty Mutual 
Fire would be able to remove because suit against it would have been 
commenced after February 18, 2005.39  Second, the court asserted that 
“any new claim for relief…or any other step sufficiently distinct that 
courts would treat it as independent for limitations purposes, could 
well commence a new piece of litigation for federal purposes even if it 
bears an old docket number for state purposes.”40  The court, citing to 
28 U.S.C. §1446(b), explained that amending pleadings to add a 
federal claim or adding a new defendant opens a new window of 
removal.41  The court then posited that a similar approach may apply 
under CAFA, relying upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 
which defines whether a claim either relates back to the original suit, 
or when it is sufficiently independent of the original suit that it must 
be treated as new litigation.42  The court did not have occasion to 
apply the theory in this stage of Knudsen, but forthcoming cases 
presented an opportunity.   
 In Schorsch v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the Seventh Circuit heard 
an interlocutory appeal of a remand order, where defendant removed 
on the basis of a change to class definition that occurred post-CAFA.43  
Defendant argued that the change in class definition did not relate 
back to the original complaint because the amendment asserted a claim 
based on computer chips in toner and the original complaint asserted a 
claim based on computer chips in drum kits.44  
                                                 
38 Id. at 807-808. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 807. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 417 F.3d 728, 751 (7th Cir. 2005). 
44 Id. at 750 
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  Although the court ultimately concluded that there was no 
jurisdiction under CAFA and remanded the case, the court expanded 
upon its relation back theory from Knudsen.  First, the court explained 
that, although it discussed relation back according to federal rules in 
Knudsen, state law determines when a suit has been commenced for 
diversity purposes, and thus state relation back doctrine must apply in 
this case.45  In Illinois, similar to the federal rules, a claim relates back 
when it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as that of the 
original complaint.  Furthermore, an amendment relates back in 
Illinois “when the original complaint ‘furnished to the defendant all 
the information necessary…to prepare a defense to the claim 
subsequently asserted in the amended complaint.’”46  Concluding that 
plaintiffs’ amendment did, indeed, arise out of the same transaction as 
the original complaint, the court noted that “[a]mendments to class 
definitions do not commence new suits.”47  Amendments asserting 
wholly distinct claims may, but “the workaday changes routine in 
class suits do not.”48 
 The Seventh Circuit had occasion to revisit the Knudsen case, 
in what is commonly referred to as “Knudsen II.”  After Knudsen was 
initially remanded, the state court certified the class and defendant, 
once again, removed.49  The state court determined that Liberty 
Mutual concealed Liberty Mutual Fire’s role in the litigation, and 
found this concealment so egregious that it entered a default judgment 
on the merits against Liberty Mutual.50  Plaintiffs asked the state court 
to certify a class which would hold Liberty Mutual responsible for all 
policies issued by any subsidiary or affiliate, and to hold that all 
claims on all policies by all insureds throughout the nation be covered 
by the default judgment.51  The plaintiffs further asked the court to 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 751. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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name them representatives of the nationwide class and to disregard 
any differences in other states’ laws.52   
The state court judge approved the changes, essentially holding 
Liberty Mutual liable by default for a nationwide class of insureds, 
many of whom held policies through Liberty Mutual’s unnamed 
affiliates.53  The district court again remanded, and the Seventh Circuit 
heard the case on interlocutory appeal.54  On appeal from the district 
court’s decision to remand, the Seventh Circuit determined that 
plaintiffs’ changes constituted an amendment that did not relate back 
under Illinois law, and thus a new action had commenced for purposes 
of CAFA.55  The court noted that, although a new defendant was not 
added, Liberty Mutual was faced with new claims for relief.56  The 
court determined that the original pleading could not have afforded 
Liberty Mutual with notice of the new claims, because the new claims 
sought to hold Liberty Mutual liable for adjustments performed under 
a distinct system by an affiliate.57  Finally, the court explained that 
Knudsen demonstrated exactly the type of case that prompted 
Congress to enact CAFA, noting that: 
 
The conduct of plaintiffs and the state judge in this litigation, 
turning an arguable error in discovery into a sprawling 
proceeding in which Liberty Mutual will be required to pay on 
account of other insurers’ decisions taken long ago under 
different rules for calculating proper payment, and without 
even an opportunity to defend itself on the merits or even insist 
that the policies’ actual terns be honored, illustrates why 
Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act.58 
 
                                                 
52 Id. at *1. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
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The Seventh Circuit approach, therefore, allows federal jurisdiction 
over cases that were filed in state court pre-CAFA, if a plaintiff class 
amends the complaint, post-CAFA, to either 1) add a new defendant, 
or 2) add a claim which would be considered new for limitations 
purposes under state relation back doctrine.  CAFA does not provide 
jurisdiction, however, when plaintiffs make routine amendments to a 
complaint.  The court’s decisions seem to have notice as a common 
factor—where a defendant could not have been on notice of plaintiffs’ 
post-CAFA changes, at the time the suit was originally filed in state 
court—those changes will commence a new civil action which will be 
removable under CAFA. 
 
B. The Narrow Interpretation of CAFA 
 
 Although all of the circuit courts to address CAFA’s 
commencement provision have adopted the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation of CAFA’s applicability, district courts in Arkansas59 
and Iowa have determined that CAFA applies only to cases which 
were filed in state court after February 18, 2005.60  This narrow 
interpretation rests upon two major arguments, the plain language and 
legislative history of the statute. 
 
1. Plain Language 
 
 In Weekly v. Guidant, an Arkansas district court rejected 
defendant’s argument that an amendment to certify a nationwide class 
commences a new civil action for purposes of jurisdiction under 
CAFA, claiming that Congress used “clear, unambiguous, and familiar 
legal terms” when defining to which cases CAFA would apply.61   
                                                 
59 Recently, the 8th Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s approach, rather than 
that of the district court in its circuit, without discussion.  See  Plubell v. Merck & 
Co., 434 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2006) 
 60 Weekly v. Guidant, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1068 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Comes v. 
Microsoft, 403 F.Supp.2d 897, 903 (S.D. Iowa 2005).   
61 Id. at 1067. 
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 The district court referenced the use of the phrase “any civil 
action” in other removal statutes.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1452, any claim 
or cause of action may be removed; the court therefore determined 
that statutes delineate between a “civil action” and a “claim or cause of 
action.”62  Moreover, in order to amend a pleading, a civil action must 
already be commenced.63  The district court concluded that the phrase 
“civil action” in CAFA, therefore, refers to all components of a 
proceeding, including subsequent changes; as such, it can only be 
commenced once.64   
The district court also referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), which 
provides that if a case by its initial pleadings is not removable, the 
defendant may file notice of removal within thirty days after the 
defendant receives “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or 
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 
which is or has become removable….”65  The court determined that, if 
Congress intended for CAFA to apply to civil actions commenced in 
state court pre-CAFA, that became removable post-CAFA, it would 
have included the same language in CAFA’s applicability provision.66  
The district court dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s relation back 
approach on the same grounds, noting that Congress did not include 
any language in CAFA stating that it “applied to actions in which the 
complaint was amended after February 18, 2005, so as to make the 
action removable, unless the amendment related back to the initial 
complaint.”67 
2. Legislative History 
 
The district court in Weekly also relied upon CAFA’s 
legislative history in concluding that Congress intended a narrow 
interpretation of § 9.  The court noted that a under previous version of 
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the house bill, CAFA provided jurisdiction in cases where a class 
certification order was entered after CAFA’s enactment date.  Under 
that version, CAFA would apply, not only to cases filed in state court 
post-CAFA, but also to cases filed in state court pre-CAFA—where 
the state court made the class certification decision post-CAFA.  The 
version of CAFA that Congress eventually passed contained no such 
language.  The court concluded, therefore, that Congress intended to 
narrow CAFA’s applicability to include only cases which were filed in 
state court post-CAFA.68 
An Iowa district court, in Comes v. Microsoft Corporation, 
relied upon much of the same analysis as Weekly in determining that 
CAFA applies only to cases which were filed in state court after 
CAFA’s enactment.69  The Comes court further pointed out that this 
narrow interpretation of CAFA’s applicability comports with 
“Congress’s intent to limit the effect of [] CAFA on currently pending 
legislation.”  The court also cites a previous Iowa district court 
decision70, which refers to two statements in the Congressional Record 
from sponsoring legislators, indicating that CAFA does not apply to 
state cases which were pending at the time CAFA was enacted.71 
The district court decisions narrowly interpreting CAFA rest 
upon a presumption that Congress did not intend to for CAFA to apply 
retroactively.  Because of this presumption, these courts held that 
CAFA cannot apply to pending state court cases where, post-CAFA, 
plaintiffs added either a new defendant or a new claim, because 
Congress did not include specific language in the statute.   
                                                 
68 Id. at 1068-69. 
69 Comes v. Microsoft, 403 F.Supp.2d 897, 903 (S.D. Iowa 2005). 
70 Brown v. Kerkhoff, No. 4:05 CV 00274 JEG, 2005 WL 2671529 at *6 n.12 
(S.D. Iowa October 19, 2005) . 
71 151 Cong. Rec. S1080 (daily ed. February 8, 2005) (statement of Sen. Dodd) 
([The Act] does not apply retroactively, despite those who wanted it to.  A case filed 
before the date of enactment will be unaffected by any provision of this 
legislation.”); 151 Cong. Rec. H753 (daily ed. February 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Goodlatte) (“Since the legislation is not retroactive, it would have absolutely no 
effect on the 75 class actions already filed against Merck in the wake of the Vioxx 
withdrawal.”) 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
15 
 
C. Courts Should Continue to Adopt the Seventh Circuit Approach 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of § 9 of CAFA is more 
well-reasoned in light of CAFA’s purpose and legislative history, and 
in light of existing federal law.   
The district court in Weekly looked to CAFA’s legislative 
history to conclude that CAFA does not apply to state court suits that 
were pending when it passed.  The court relied principally on the fact 
that a previous version of CAFA included broader language, that 
CAFA would apply to suits where the class certification order 
occurred post-CAFA.  The court concluded that because Congress 
changed the language to suits which “commenced” post-CAFA, it 
intended that CAFA would not apply to any cases that were already 
pending.   
The more narrow language of CAFA’s current applicability 
provision, however, does not signal that Congress intended to exclude 
civil actions with significant post-CAFA amendments from 
jurisdiction.  If CAFA provided jurisdiction over any case that was 
certified as a class after February 18, 2005, there would be a huge 
retroactive application of CAFA.  Any class action that was filed in 
state court pre-CAFA, but where the court did not make a decision 
regarding certification until after CAFA passed would be subject to 
removal.  However, under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation, the 
only cases that can be removed are those where the defendant either 
could not have been on notice about a new claim or where a defendant 
was not even a party to the suit at the time of filing.  Therefore, the 
Seventh Circuit’s approach does not retroactively apply CAFA; 
jurisdiction will only exist where a civil action has gone through a 
significant enough change that it either commences against a new 
party or it commences an entirely new claim.   
Although allowing removal of some cases that were filed in 
state court before CAFA was enacted may upset the settled 
expectations of class plaintiffs, class plaintiffs retain control over how 
they want their suit to proceed.  If a class wants to prevent removal of 
the suit, the class need only refrain from adding new parties or 
15
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drastically changing the definition of the class at this point in the 
litigation. 
 
1. New Defendants 
  
 The Seventh Circuit correctly determined that amending a 
complaint to add a new defendant constitutes commencement of a new 
civil action, thus providing federal jurisdiction under CAFA.  The civil 
action commences as to the newly added defendant at the time the 
defendant is added, not at the time the suit was originally filed in state 
court, for three reasons.  First, existing case law dictates that a suit 
cannot commence against a defendant before they are a party to the 
suit, as they would have no notice and be unable to raise defenses.  
Second, existing federal law provides for a new window of removal—
where removal was not originally possible—after a complaint is 
amended.  Third, under CAFA, any defendant may remove a suit to 
federal court—meaning that if a suit commences against a new 
defendant after CAFA’s effective date, that new defendant can remove 
the entire civil action. 
 Although CAFA does not contain specific language that it 
applies to new parties added post-CAFA, the statute fails to define the 
term “commence” altogether.  Therefore, it is logical that CAFA was 
not intended to replace existing case law regarding when a suit is 
commenced against a new defendant.  The general rule is that “a party 
brought into court by an amendment, and who has, for the first time, 
an opportunity to make defense to the action, has a right to treat the 
proceeding, as to him, as commenced by the process which brings him 
into court.”72  The reasoning behind this rule is that defendants should 
not be deprived of actions that they could have taken were they 
originally parties to the suit, because they had no notice of the original 
proceedings.73  Interpreting CAFA to state that a civil action 
commences against a defendant at the time it was initially filed in state 
                                                 
72 Braud v. Transport Service Co. of Illinois, 445 F.3d 801, 805  (5th Cir. 
2006) (citing United States v. Martinez, 195 U.S. 469 (1904)). 
73 See Braud,  445 F.3d at 805. 
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court, before that defendant was a party, is contrary to firmly 
established principles of notice. 
 Moreover, under the existing removal statute, a new window of 
removal opens where the initial case was not removable, but where a 
defendant receives “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or 
other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 
which is or has become removable.”74  In any other state court case, if 
addition of a new defendant would provide diversity jurisdiction, the 
defendants can remove the case to federal court.75  It is logical to 
assume that if Congress intended to change existing law regarding 
when defendants could remove suits, it would have included specific 
language in CAFA speaking to it.  Suits filed in state court pre-CAFA 
are not removable because CAFA does not retroactively apply; 
however, when plaintiffs add a new defendant, the suit becomes 
removable by that defendant—because it has commenced as to him 
post-CAFA.  Because CAFA allows a suit to be removed by any 
defendant, the new defendant can remove the entire civil action to 
federal court.76 
2. New Claims 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision that new claims added post-CAFA 
may give rise to jurisdiction is logical in light of existing federal law 
regarding statutes of limitations. 
In deciding that a civil action can commence only once, the 
Weekly court relied upon the distinction between a “civil action” and a 
“claim” or “cause of action.”  The Weekly court held that because a 
civil action encompasses all subsequent changes, it can only 
commence once—at the time a plaintiff initially files it in state court.  
However, this distinction does not undermine the Seventh Circuit’s 
interpretation.  Although a civil action may commence only once, 
when plaintiffs add a new claim that does not relate back to the 
original civil action, it is separate and fresh litigation.  Therefore, it 
                                                 
74 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2005); Id. 
75 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2005). 
76 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (b) (2005). 
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does not “re-commence” the civil action, but rather, it is a new civil 
action—commencing for the first time.  This is demonstrated by the 
use of “relation-back” doctrine in the context of statutes of limitations.  
The reason why courts determine that new claims are barred by 
statutes of limitations when they do not relate back to the original 
cause of action, is because they are considered commencement of new 
“civil action”, and that civil action has commenced after the statute of 
limitations has run.  The Weekly court’s distinction between “civil 
actions” and “claims”, if carried over to statutes of limitations, would 
seem to dictate that plaintiffs could amend complaints to add new and 
wholly distinct “claims” after the statute of limitations had run.  
Because the new claims are subsumed by the greater civil action, and 
because the civil action was filed within the statute of limitations, the 
claims would not be barred. 
Although the Seventh Circuit’s relation-back analysis borrows 
from a seemingly separate area of law, statutes of limitations, its use in 
the CAFA context is appropriate.  The purpose of the relation-back 
doctrine is to prevent plaintiffs from escaping the statute of limitations 
on a new claim simply by tacking it on to a pending claim.  However, 
plaintiffs are not barred from adding new claims, even after the statute 
of limitations has run, if those claims “relate-back” to the original 
cause of action.  The Federal Rules define relation back as when the 
claim asserted in the amended pleading “arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth…in the original pleading.”77 The 
Federal Rules, and most states, employ the relation-back doctrine, 
therefore, to exclude only those amendments to the original pleadings 
that the defendant did not have notice of.  Under this standard, courts 
assume that the defendant will not be prejudiced if the new cause of 
action is allowed to proceed, because the defendant either was or 
should have been aware that it might be liable.  However, if the new 
cause of action does not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence as the original civil action, it is deemed separate and fresh 
litigation—or, in other words, a new civil action which is barred by the 
statute of limitations.  If an amendment to the original pleadings can 
                                                 
77 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
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be considered new litigation for statute of limitations purposes, it 
should also be considered “commencement” of a new civil action in 
the CAFA context.  If a class action defendant could not have been on 
notice of the cause of action in an amended complaint, that cause of 
action cannot be said to be part of the original civil action.  Rather, it is 




CAFA has broadened federal diversity jurisdiction over state court 
class action suits in several ways.  It has lessened diversity, amount in 
controversy, and removal requirements.  However, determining to 
which cases CAFA applies is no easy task.  Because the statute fails to 
define when a civil action “commences”, federal courts have 
attempted to fashion their own interpretation of the term. 
The Seventh Circuit has broadly interpreted CAFA’s applicability, 
and several other circuits have followed suit.  Because Congress failed 
to define the term “commence”, the Seventh Circuit borrowed 
concepts from existing federal law in reaching the determination that 
CAFA can provide jurisdiction over state court class actions suits that 
were pending at the time of CAFA’s enactment.  Allowing federal 
jurisdiction over suits where plaintiffs have added either new 
defendants, or new claims which do not relate back to the original 
cause of action, does not amount to a retroactive application of CAFA, 
and therefore is consistent with CAFA’s legislative history. 
Other circuit courts facing this issue should adopt the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach.  Although plaintiff class members’ settled 
expectations of litigating their cases in state court may be upset in 
some cases, plaintiffs retain control over how their suit proceeds.  If a 
plaintiff class refrains from adding new defendants or new claims 
which do not relate to the original pleadings, defendants will be unable 
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